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1 Introduction
Contemporary metaphysics is heavily concerned with its methodology and
epistemic status. This is for a good reason: in the virtual absence of exper-
iments, predictions, and empirical feedback, it is far from clear how meta-
physical theories and views can be rationally justified. These ‘meta-level’
issues are notoriously as impenetrable as they are important, alas. We
can make the task more manageable by focusing on the role and status of
explanatory considerations in metaphysics. Explanatory arguments and in-
ference to the best explanation play a central, perhaps foundational role
in metaphysics. The ‘explanationist’ methodology, although far from being
universally adhered to, is widespread and commonly adopted in one form
or another. While the notion of metaphysical explanation remains murky
and nebulous, and while some have expressed qualms about inference to the
best explanation altogether, explanationism has been bravely defended by
others. I will argue that these vindications of explanationism in metaphysics
turn out to be superficial and vexed, especially in their affiliation to explan-
ationism in science. Even if we grant the legitimacy to explanationism in
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science and everyday life, it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to defend
explanationism in metaphysics.
The advocates of inference to the best explanation—‘the explanationists’—
have much to learn from the study of explanation and explanatory infer-
ences in science. Scientists, like metaphysicians, are also in the business of
explaining the world, and explanatory considerations arguably also guide
scientific inferences (as the advocates of explanationism are quick to point
out). Studies of scientific explanation and explanatory inferences in history
and philosophy of science offer a grasp on these issues that has a direct bear-
ing on explanationism in ‘naturalistic’ metaphysics that is ‘continuous’ with
scientific theorising. The study of explanation and explanatory inferences
in science reveals serious shortcomings in prevalent attempts to vindicate
explanationism in metaphysics by reference to continuity between science
and naturalistic metaphysics.
2 Explanationism in metaphysics
Explanations and explanatory inferences abound in metaphysics; sometimes
it is hard to see how metaphysics could even be done if not by compar-
ing potential explanations. I will not question the credentials of all such
explanatory reasoning tout court, but rather focus on explanationists who
emphasise the continuity between metaphysics and science. Here are some
exemplars of this more specific target, in alphabetical order.
Armstrong (1983, 1997) famously argues for his account of natural laws
via inference to the best explanation. Armstrong also explicitly likens his
argument to explanatory inferences to theoretical entities in science. Even
induction by reference to laws “becomes a particular case of the inference to
explanatory (‘theoretical’) entities”, and “the law, a relation between uni-
versals, is a theoretical entity, postulation of which explains the observed
phenomena and predicts further observations” (1983, p. 104). Armstrong
ultimately says precious little about the nature and justification of this kind
of inference in general, only maintaining that the main explanatory ad-
vantage of his laws-as-universals view is unification, the relevance of which
Armstrong supports by reference to the unificationist theories of scientific
explanation.
We avail ourselves in [metaphysics] of whatever apparently good
cannons of explanation we possess or can develop. The basic
insight here seems to be involved in the concept of a good ex-
planation: that it should genuinely unify, and that it should be
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genuinely informative. (Armstrong 1983, p. 105)
The premiss required here is that, as argued by Michael Fried-
man [and Philip Kitcher], in the natural sciences what, before
anything else, counts as a good explanation is something that
unifies the phenomena. (Armstrong 1997, p. 235)
We can continue the list of like-minded explanationists with Bigelow,
Colyvan, Dorato, Ellis, and so forth.1 All these prominent philosophers—
mostly from Australasia, as it happens—have advocated a conception of
scientific realism according to which inference to the best explanation can
support not only realism about electrons and quarks and the like, but also
metaphysical views about e.g. mathematical abstracta, possibilia, laws of
nature, the nature of properties and probabilities, and mereology. In the
case of Ellis (2009), for instance, the explanationist methodology results
in ‘metaphysics of scientific realism’ the ontological count of which includes
properties, powers, causes, events, propensities, dispositions, spatiotemporal
and numerical relations, all of which are argued for via inference to the best
explanation—a methodology unifying metaphysics and science.2
Psillos (2005), an explanationist in philosophy of science, sympathises
with Ellis’s explanationism by acknowledging that Ellis’s project “rests on
the only workable criterion of reality [...]: something is real if its positing
plays an indispensable role in the explanation of well-founded phenomena”
(398). As Psillos notes, there is a close connection between this ‘explan-
atory criterion of reality’, also found in Sellars (1963), and the well-known
indispensability argument for mathematical platonism. The latter, as cham-
pioned by its leading contemporary advocates, is again directly associated
with explanationism in science.3
Swoyer (2008) presents an argument for ontological commitment to math-
ematical and other abstracta that is quite unlike the indispensability argu-
1See e.g. Bigelow (2010), John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter (1990), Colyvan (2006),
Dorato (2012), Ellis (2009).
2According to Ellis the test of a good metaphysical hypothesis is twofold: “it must be
consistent with the known facts, and be part of a unifying account of reality that explains
the overall structure of what we are able to observe” (2009, p. 123).
3See, for example, Colyvan (2006, p. 229):
“I will take the indispensability argument to be an argument that puts pres-
sure on the marriage of scientific realism and nominalism. It does this be-
cause the style of argument [viz. IBE] is one which scientific realists already
endorse.”
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ment. But it is also a forthright instance of explanationism, with a clear
emphasis on methodological similarity with science.
The chief philosophical benefit claimed for . . . abstract entit-
ies is that they . . . help explain otherwise puzzling phenomena
. . . [IBE] is not some arcane concoction of meta-physicians. We
often infer that something exists on the grounds that its ex-
istence would explain something that would otherwise be puzz-
ling. . . Such inferences also seem common in science. . . (Swoyer
2008, p. 16)
Swoyer reflects on the methodology of metaphysics, and for him explanation-
ism represents the answer to ‘how ontology might be possible’ (cf. Swoyer
1999). The idea that explanationism and its methodological affinity with
science provides an answer to methodological scruples about metaphysics
has also been recently defended by Paul (2012), amongst others.4
Explanationism is popular in meta-ethics as well. Here an explicit con-
nection to explanationism in science is drawn by Sturgeon (2006), for ex-
ample.5 Examples proliferate; clearly explanationism, with a nod to science,
flourishes in metaphysics and beyond.6 Every philosopher above has their
4See Paul (2012, p. 22):
This is a central part of my thesis: if we accept inference to the best explan-
ation in ordinary reasoning and in scientific theorizing, we should accept it
in metaphysical theorizing.
5See Sturgeon (2006, p. 243):
The justification of many of our beliefs, not just perceptual beliefs, derives
from their explanatory role. Thus, for example, the justification of many
scientific beliefs is said to lie in their contributing to good explanations of
observed evidence . . . and beliefs about others psychological states may ex-
plain what we observe of their behaviour. . . . [A]lmost everyone agrees that
explanatory coherence . . . is an epistemic virtue in a set of beliefs, contrib-
uting other things equal to its being well justified. And this is thought to be
especially so when there is explanatory integration across significantly differ-
ent categories: beliefs about the past explaining evidence in the present, or
beliefs about unobservables explaining what we observe, for example. Now,
if evaluative beliefs play a plausible role in explaining other facts we have
reason to believe in, facts that are not themselves evaluative, then they will
be candidates for justification of a similar sort, by their integrative explan-
atory role.
6In the sphere of epistemology, Pargetter (1984) advocates explanationism as a response
to skepticisms about other minds by viewing inferences to other minds as being relevantly
similar to “arguments to the best explanation in science.”7 McLaughlin (2010) makes
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critics, of course, but no wholesale assessment has been given of their com-
mon methodological denominator: a widespread justificatory appeal to a
similarity between metaphysical theorising and the explanatory practices of
science. There are obvious questions to be asked here: What kind of sim-
ilarity is this? What kind of justification does it support? What are the
limits of such justification of metaphysical views?
I will next characterise in more detail two ways in which philosophers
have attempted to capitalise on the similarity between naturalistic meta-
physics and science, setting the scene for a more critical discussion to take
place in Sections 4 and 5.
3 Naturalistic metaphysics and science
Naturalistic metaphysicians theorise about the natural world—a world also
studied by science—by conceiving, assessing and supporting various theor-
ies about it. Many of these theories are admittedly quite speculative. I
am interested in the brand of naturalistic metaphysics that recommends,
as a methodological dictum, turning to science to see how theories are best
assessed and supported. Many naturalists have happily followed Quine in
accepting the following three broad methodological judgements. First, in
science we find a broad methodological injunction to let theoretical virtues
guide theorizing, at least regarding matters that are unobservable to our
‘naked senses’.8 Secondly, in science we can witness (a degree of) confirma-
tion holism: a theory can be related to evidence only as a part of a wider
web of theoretical beliefs, not in and of itself. And thirdly, science (suitably
interpreted) has all the answers to questions of ontology: there is no ‘first
philosophy’ concerning questions of existence. These three naturalist tenets
lead to two broad strategies to support explanationism in metaphysics.
The first strategy capitalises on methodological similarity between meta-
physics and science in the spirit of the first tenet above. Consider how this
tenet is exemplified in the apologia for metaphysics by Sider, Hawthorne,
and Zimmermann (2007).
Scientists must regularly choose between many theories that are
consistent with the observed data. Their choices are governed by
criteria like simplicity, comprehensiveness, and elegance. This is
comparable use of inference to the best explanation in philosophy of mind, and Biggs
(2011) runs a similar line of thought in relation to modal epistemology.
8For Quine the same theoretical virtues are also important for justifying our views
concerning common sense objects.
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especially true in very theoretical parts of science, for instance
theoretical physics [. . . ] Just like scientists, metaphysicians be-
gin with observations, albeit quite mundane ones: there are ob-
jects, these objects have properties, they last over time, and so
on. And just like scientists, metaphysicians go on to construct
general theories based on these observations, even though the
observations do not logically settle which theory is correct. In
doing so, metaphysicians use standards for choosing theories that
are like the standards used by scientists simplicity, comprehens-
iveness, elegance, and so on. (p. 7)
Sider et al. stress the idea that in metaphysics, just as in physics, theory
choice is governed by theoretical virtues. In effect, they hold that meta-
physics is but a degree apart from the more speculative reaches of empirical
science, and regardless of its highly speculative character the methodological
similarity with science nevertheless justifies the rationality and meaningful-
ness of metaphysics as a theoretical endeavour. This is a very broad idea,
of course, and there are many ways to make it more precise. In particu-
lar, one can refine it in explanationist terms, leading to a vindication of
explanationism in metaphysics. Thus, Swoyer (in Sider et al., 2008), for
example, appeals to inference to the best explanation in framing a method-
ological similarity between his arguments for Platonism, on the one hand,
and science on the other.
My suggestion is that we should (re)construe arguments for the
existence of abstract entities as inferences to the best over-all
available ontological explanation. [. . . ] Inference to the best
explanation plays a central role in daily life and, according to
many philosophers, in science. [. . . ] [M]any maintain, without
inferences to the best explanation science, and much of ordinary
life, would be impossible. (p. 15)
This is a good example of the strategy that aims to justify explanationism
in metaphysics by reference to a methodological uniformity. (See also Paul,
2012.)9
9Note that these philosophers are patently not claiming that metaphysical theories are
equally well supported by evidence as our scientific theories are. Rather, the claim is that
the kind of justification is arguably similar to theoretical domains of science. Metaphysics
is undeniably much more speculative than science, and one should not object to explana-
tionism in metaphysics—as e.g. Ladyman (2007, 2012) partly does—on the grounds that
it does not have a probative force on a par with the explanatory considerations arguably
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As an aside, it is worth nothing that a similar line of thought has been
popular in the scientific realism debate in philosophy of science. Here natur-
alism has been taken to imply that an explanationist argument for scientific
realism should exemplify the same method as scientists themselves employ:
the realist’s inference to the best explanation—empirical success is best ex-
plained by approximate truth—should be viewed as a further application of
scientific explanationism.10 The realist inference thus arguably exemplifies
the same method as various explanatory inferences in science—a fact that
arguably provides support for scientific realism via a rule-circular justifica-
tion of the realist’s inference. (Cf. Psillos, 1999, ch. 4; 2011).11 This, too,
is an example of the same strategy for justifying explanationism outside
science.
Let’s now move on to the second strategy that capitalises on confirm-
ational holism. This flows out of the three tenets of naturalism as follows.
In answering questions of ontology naturalists turn to our best scientific
theories, and confirmation holism recommends belief in all theoretical as-
sumptions that are responsible for the (predictive, explanatory, whatever)
successes provide realism-eliciting evidence for a given theory. Our grasp of
theoretical virtues further shapes our understanding of those successes. This
gives rise to a Quinean ‘indispensability argument’: we ought to have com-
mitment to whatever indispensably contributes to our best theories being
the best. This then leads to a justification of metaphysical views when it is
argued that assuming realism about paradigmatic scientific posits (electrons,
quarks, etc.) we should also be committed to paradigmatically philosophical
operative in science. For this is just to object to metaphysics’ speculative nature, not to
explanationism in metaphysics per se.
10As Putman puts it, scientific realism should be “viewed . . . as part of the only scientific
explanation of the success of science” (1975, p. 73). Similarly, Psillos maintains that
“naturalistic philosophers of science “should employ no methods other than those used by
the scientists themselves” (Psillos 1999, p. 78), and Boyd argues that “the epistemology
of empirical science is an empirical science.” (Boyd, 1989, p. 13).
11 Note that here, too, a naturalistic philosopher is not committed to claiming that
her philosophical theory (about science) can be supported to the same degree that sci-
entific theories themselves are supported. One should not object to explanationism in
this context merely on the grounds that it does not have probative force on a par with
the explanatory inferences in science. This mistake is made by Frost-Arnold (2010), who
argues that the realist explanation (and the related inference to the best explanation) fails
to satisfy scientific demands for a good explanation (and good explanatory inference), and
therefore fails the tenets of naturalism. This demand is based on too strict a conception
of naturalism. The realist explanation can be purely philosophical in the sense of not
enjoying the degree of evidence enjoyed by paradigmatically good scientific explanations.
The mode of inference can be the same in the two cases, while the overall evidence (or
‘epistemological standard’) is not.
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assumptions (e.g. existence of abstracta, the presentist view of time) on the
basis of their allegedly similar role in contributing to our best theories.
This broad idea of confirmational holism can be further refined in differ-
ent ways. In particular, the notion of indispensability at stake is sometimes
framed in explanationist terms, leading to a vindication of explanationism
with respect to metaphysical claims. For example, the advocates of the
so-called ‘explanatory indispensability argument’ have recently argued that
metaphysical posits (e.g. mathematical and other abstracta) can indispens-
ably contribute to some of our best scientific explanations in a way that is
ontologically committing (by scientific realist lights).12 Such arguments aim
to establish that paradigmatically metaphysical views (e.g. platonism) can
enjoy a degree of empirical confirmation by virtue of the relevant assump-
tions (e.g. regarding numbers) playing an appropriate explanatory role—a
role that is appropriately continuous with those played by paradigmatically
scientific assumptions.
* * *
The scene is now set for a more critical discussion. I will not be taking
issue with naturalism or the broad idea that science and metaphysics can be
viewed ‘of a piece’. Rather, through a closer reflection on explanationism in
science I will only take issue with the explanationist spin that has been put
on these two strategies for vindicating naturalistic metaphysics. An incent-
ive for this springs from within the naturalistic conception of philosophy.
As said, naturalism recommends turning to science to see how theories are
best assessed and supported. But exactly which scientific disciplines should
we turn to in forming a view of the successful scientific methodology and
its limits? I think we should follow Quine himself and understand ‘science’
quite broadly, so that all scientific findings concerning science and scientists
should be taken on board, including those from the history of science and
the relevant areas of psychology.13 After all, there’s every reason to expect
12See, for example, Colyvan (2006, p. 229):
[IBE] is a special case of the indispensability argument. [T]his is a style
of argument that the scientific realist accepts. Mathematical entities surely
feature prominently in various explanations.
See also Baker (2009) and Psillos (2011) for arguments in the same spirit.
13See e.g. Quine (1995, p. 49):
I use science broadly, including not only the ‘hard sciences’ but also ‘softer
sciences’, from psychology and economics through sociology to history.
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that these areas of enquiry have potential to inform us of our capacity and
reliability in explanatory reasoning. With this in mind, let us now have a
closer look at the two strategies for vindicating explanationism, in the light
of the study of explanation and explanatory inferences in psychology and
history and philosophy of science.
4 On the strategy of methodological similarity
I will now critically examine arguments that defend explanationism in meta-
physics by reference to methodological similarity with science (e.g. Swoyer
1999, 2008, Paul 2012). I will put aside various differences in details and
focus on a common gambit of methodological unity, which can be expressed
in general terms as follows.14
The gambit begins with the premise that explanationism is truth-conducive
in (some relevant area of) science, and hence justified in that context. It is
then argued that (a given area of) metaphysics is methodologically unified
with science in the sense that:
MC1 Both metaphysics and science employ inference to the best explana-
tion.
MC2 We have no reason to think that if explanationism is truth-conducive
in science, it is not so in metaphysics.
MC3 We have a positive reason to think that if explanationism is truth-
conducive in science, it is also so in metaphysics.
On the basis of these assumptions the gambit concludes that explanationism
in (the given area of) metaphysics is truth-conducive, and hence rational
and justified also in that context. (Note that MC2 does not entail MC3:
even if we cannot see why explanationism would fail to be truth-conducive
only in metaphysics, we may not be able to positively argue for its truth-
conduciveness either. Both MC2 and MC3 are required to tackle a sceptic
who demands a positive argument for the use of IBE in metaphysics.)
As far as I’m concerned, the conclusion follows if MC1–MC3 can be es-
tablished. But the problem is that MC2 and MC3 have not been established,
and there is reason to think that they cannot be established.15 It is fairly
14Typically explanationists only offer vague tu quoque references to science, scientific
realism, and inference to the best explanation therein. I construe them as aspiring to the
schema presented here.
15There is reason to be sceptical about MC1 as well. Cf. e.g. Ladyman (2012).
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obvious that without support for MC2 and MC3 the gambit reduces to a
more or less trivial recognition that theory-choice in different contexts and
disciplines can be described in similar explanationist terms at some level of
abstraction. It is clear that this kind of purely descriptive continuity does
not in itself carry any justificatory weight. It is comparable to a folly at-
tempt to justify any old enumerative induction merely on the basis of it
being of the same form as some licit enumerative inductions. (Cf. Norton
2003)
Before we analyse the problems with MC2 and MC3 in detail, it is worth
noting an ill-considered worry about the gambit. It has to do with an appro-
priate reading of ‘truth-conducive’ and ‘justification’ in the schema above.
One might think that the gambit is problematic if we have reason think that
inferences to the best explanation are much less reliable in metaphysics than
they are in science, or even if we lack a positive reason for thinking that they
are equally reliable in both. For example, one might point to differences in
the disciplines’ track records—physics vs. metaphysics, say—or argue that
our best reasons for thinking that scientific IBEs are reliable do not carry
over to metaphysics, raising the spectre of potential unreliability (Cf. Lady-
man, 2012). And one might think, in particular, that any such worry about
the relative reliability in different domains is ipso facto a worry about either
MC2 or MC3.
Although there is something to this worry—one cannot wholly divorce
a method’s reliability from its justification—it is quite difficult to square
it with the fact that metaphysics is admittedly inherently speculative in
a way that our best science arguably is not. I take it that theorising in
metaphysics is generally not taken to be progressive in the way science is.
For the realist at least, science is systematically latching better and better
onto unobservable reality, and scientific theorising is guided or constrained
by ‘correspondence principles’ that are grounded in the ideal of discernible
continuity in theoretical development. Whatever progress metaphysical the-
orising makes, it appears to be compatible with the likelihood of much more
significant theoretical discontinuities. Accordingly, our degree of confidence
is admittedly significantly lower to any particular output of explanatory
reasoning in metaphysics. But this need not mean that in metaphysics ex-
planatory loveliness is not in any sense functioning reliably as a guide to
inductive likeliness.16 For instance, it could be that in metaphysics we are
much less able to think of a pool of potential alternative explanations from
16See Lipton (1999) for an explication of the explanationist slogan that ‘explanatory
loveliness guides inductive likeliness’.
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which we choose the ‘best’, so that we often end up debating over the ‘best
of a bad lot’.17 Still, it could be that inference to the best explanation is
quite reliable in picking out the right theory assuming that it happens to
be included in the pool. In this way the method could be reliable for ex-
ample ‘in the long run’ (assuming that we eventually manage to conceive
of the right theories) and also rational, despite not being reliable in the
sense of engendering high degree of confidence in any particular explanatory
inference.
Hence, some difference in the method’s relative reliability is compatible
with the continuity gambit, because such a difference need not affect the
method’s justification, which in inherently speculative disciplines such as
metaphysics could be based on the notion of reliability ‘in the long run’,
or reliability conditional on not having a ‘bad lot’, or reliability in mere
relative ranking of alternatives. Unfortunately we have little reason to think
that explanationism is reliable even in such a qualified way. As I will next
explain, there are other differences between science and metaphysics that
give us reason to think that the (assumed) justification of explanationism in
science does not carry over to metaphysics.
4.1 Issues with MC2
The vindications of explanationism in metaphysics offer some limited sup-
port for MC2—the claim that we have no reason to think that if explan-
ationism is truth-conducive in science, it is not so in metaphysics. This
support springs from the somewhat vague notion that naturalistic meta-
physics and theoretical science are of a piece: metaphysics, like theoretical
science, is just further (albeit more abstract or general) theorising about
the unobservable world. This naturalist notion that science and metaphys-
ics, as intellectual and theoretical endeavours, are at bottom in the same
epistemological boat offers support for MC2 in so far as we have reason to
think that there are no differences between these endeavours that would be
relevant for the respective reliability of inference to the best explanation.
We can, however, point to various sui generis features of science and its
explanationist method, and to differences between science and metaphysics,
to suggest that MC2 is false: we do have reasons to think that explanation-
17The ‘bad lot’ objection against explanationism is due to van Fraassen (1989), who
employed it against the idea that it is rational to believe that the best explanation is more
likely to be (approximately) true than not. The objection loses bite if explanationism
is construed more cautiously, pertaining only to to a hypothesis’s epistemic probability
relative to its rival hypotheses. (Cf. Okasha 2000)
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ism is not suitably truth-conducive in metaphysics, even if it is (in a sense)
truth-conducive in science. For example, we can begin by noting that the
truth-conduciveness of explanationism in science can be (and arguably has
to be) qualified in ways that are not applicable to metaphysics, thus spelling
trouble to MC2. The history of science strongly indicates that explanatory
inferences in science have (at best) only been reliable in quite limited re-
spects: there’s a long and familiar tradition in the history and philosophy
of science to point the various gross falsehoods of the best science of yes-
teryear.18 Past science has seemingly not been reliable in any significant way
regarding its fundamental ontological posits, for instance.19 How should one
respond to the challenge this presents to the explanationist? One response
is to give up on IBE altogether as a guide to deep unobservable features of
the world. According to this response MC2 is irrelevant (even if true) given
the failure of its antecedent. This response is clearly quite uninteresting
in a current dialectical position, and according to many scientific realists it
furthermore throws out the IBE-baby with the bathwater, since there are
ways of qualifying the sense in which IBE reliably functions in science.
The situation faced by the advocates of scientific explanationism is (prima
facie) somewhat paradoxical: again and again in the history of science it
is precisely the metaphysical and ontological assumptions concerning the
nature of gravity and other forces, light, disease, life, genes, etc.—the as-
sumptions that were underwriting the best scientific understanding of the
relevant phenomena—that have subsequently turned out to be false.20 The
evidence for this claim can be found in the extensive literature on scientific
realism (from Laudan (1981) onwards).21 Arguably the best realist response
18See e.g. Laudan 1981, Stanford 2006, Lyons 2006, Vickers 2013.
19Famous now-rejected ontological posits include: gravitational force, caloric, phlogis-
ton, lumineferous ether, electromagnetic ether, circular inertia, miasma, vortices, vital
forces, electron orbits, to name a few. To be fair, no explanationist has alleged that in-
ference to the best explanation is a sure-fire method, even in science, but stressing the
method’s defeasibility is not a satisfactory response to the worry that the method has been
demonstrably unreliable with respect to the reality of fundamental scientific posits.
20See Doppelt (2005, 2007) and Saatsi (2012) on the internal tensions that this ‘para-
doxical’ situation can present the realist with.
21Consider the optical ether, for just one paradigmatic example. It was the assumed
existence of the ether that gave the best and only unified understanding of light phenomena
for much of the 19th century. For a nice discussion, see Cordero (2011), who also catalogues
famous testimonies of the resulting confidence in the existence of the ether. These include
Maxwell:
Whatever difficulties we may have in forming a consistent idea of the con-
stitution of the ether, there can be no doubt that the interplanetary and
interstellar spaces are not empty, but are occupied by a material substance
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is to accept that the explanationist methodology in science is only reliable
in rather limited ways: even if IBE cannot reliably function as a guide to
the fundamental nature of things (as the history suggests), it is open for
the realist to maintain that scientists, with their IBE-laden methods, nev-
ertheless systematically ‘latch onto’ reality with their theories in ways that
largely account for the predictive and instrumental successes of science. So
goes a promising realist response to the historical ‘pessimistic induction’ over
now-rejected theoretical posits and explanatory mechanisms in ‘fundamental
science’.22
The upshot is that even in the face of the pessimistic historical record
there is still room to consider explanationism in science as ‘truth-conducive’,
but only in a rather qualified sense. In the light of the history of science it
is difficult to support MC2 through the notion that metaphysics and science
are methodologically of a piece: the idea that IBE is reliable in science in
the way that explanationists would like it to be reliable in metaphysics is
arguably premised on a naive view of (the history of) science.23 Arguably
any scientific realism that is sophisticated enough to be tenable in the face
of the history of science is highly ‘selective’ regarding our epistemic com-
mitments towards the outputs of the explanationist method, which is only
reliable in limited respects. It is a matter of debate how to best characterise
the realist commitments and the method’s curtailed reliability. While the
currently favoured realist positions vary significantly in detail, they typically
incorporate the broad idea that a (radically) false theory can be empirically
successful by virtue of selectively latching onto some appropriate features
of the world. So, even if scientists’ explanatory inferences are not tracking
reality in relation to fundamental ontology, a selective realist can save the
realist day by claiming that such inferences are nevertheless reliable in ways
that fuel scientific progress: they tend to latch onto reality with respect to
those aspects of reality that generate the progress and empirical success of
or body, which is certainly the largest, and probably the most uniform body
of which we have any knowledge. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 9th ed., vol. 8
[1893], 572; this article first appeared in 1878.)
and Lord Kelvin (previously Thomson):
You can imagine particles of something, the thing whose motion constitutes
light. This thing we call the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance
we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the
reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether. (Thomson 1889, 310;
quoted in Thompson 1910, 1035)
22See e.g. Harker (2013), Saatsi (forthcoming b), and references therein.
23This point is also made forcefully by Ladyman (2012).
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science as measured e.g. in terms increasing empirical adequacy and novel
predictions. The debate is subtle and some care is required lest realism col-
lapses into empiricism, but the overall issue with MC2 is clear: the historical
track-record impels the realist to adopt thus qualified notion of reliability,
but it is rather questionable whether it makes any sense to apply such quali-
fications to explanatory inferences in metaphysics (since the relevant notion
of empirical progress seems inapplicable to metaphysics).
The historical track-record is not the only reason to worry about MC2.
There is a challenge to be faced by naturalistically inclined advocates of
explanationism in metaphysics and science alike: to account for the truth-
conduciveness of inference to the best explanation in a way that coheres suf-
ficiently well with the rest of our naturalistic world view, according to which
our capacities and ways of reasoning about the world are products of natural
and cultural evolution, and every reliable mechanism of theorising is reliable
for a natural reason amenable to a scientific study. I am not suggesting that
the onus is on the explanationist to actually provide such a naturalistic-
ally acceptable account of the workings of explanatory reasoning. But the
challenge nevertheless constrains plausible forms of explanationism, because
arguably we should at least be able to conceive of a potential account that
is naturalistically acceptable. Inability to come up with a how-possible ac-
count of the truth-conduciveness of explanatory reasoning reflects badly on
explanationism, which starts looking suspiciously mysterious. Here we find
another difference between science and metaphysics that gives us a reason
to worry about explanationism specifically in metaphysics.
To see the difference, consider first the challenge in relation to science.
The challenge is to show that it is not inconceivable how we have developed
a capacity for explanatory reasoning that tends to latch onto unobservable
reality in ways responsible for the empirical success of science. These ways
of thus ‘latching onto reality’ come in many forms. In some cases it is easy
to conceive of a naturalistically acceptable story, at least in outline. Con-
sider, for example, the explanatory reasoning that leads to knowledge of the
sorts of unobservable causal relations that underlie sophisticated scientific
interventions exemplified by gene manipulation (see e.g. Woodward 2010).
Discovering such causal connections through explanatory reasoning need not
be mysterious because the relevant mode of explanatory practice—causal-
mechanistic explanation—is also exemplified in everyday cognitive situations
that we are naturally equipped to tackle. According to the new ‘mechanistic
paradigm’ in the philosophy of science much of scientific explanation and as-
sociated explanatory reasoning, especially in the life sciences, concern such
mechanisms that are not too far-removed from commonplace mechanisms
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such as engines and clockworks (see e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005).
Such causal-mechanistic mode of explanation is, of course, inapplicable to
philosophical theorising.
Other modes of scientific explanation and explanatory reasoning call for
a different story, but in general there is something specific to science that
helps us to conceive how ‘reality tracking’ practice of explanatory inferences
could evolve even in much more abstract contexts, such as theoretical phys-
ics or mathematical biology. In particular, we can appeal to the myriad
ways in which experimental feedback in science can conceivably shape sci-
entists’ domain-dependent judgments of explanatory goodness so as to result
in a truth-tracking explanationist methodology (e.g. Kuipers 2002). This is
compatible with the kind of explanatory pluralism in science that has been
recently emphasised by many (e.g. Douglas 2009), as one would indeed ex-
pect a degree of divergence in a detailed evolution of explanationism. It is
clearly highly questionable whether these conceivable accounts of the (qual-
ified) reliability of explanationism in science can in any way be extended
to inferences to the best explanation in metaphysics, where experimental
feedback plays no such role in guiding the explanatory practice.
All this points to a challenge to the metaphysical explanationist that is
comparable to the one that Field (1989) (following Benacerraf) has famously
posed to the mathematical Platonist. All things considered, it appears much
more difficult to conceive of a naturalistically acceptable account of the
truth-conduciveness of explanationism in metaphysics. The onus is on the
explanationist to show that we can conceive of an account of our reliability
in explanatory inferences concerning, say, matters of fundamental ontology
or modality. Broad references to explanationism in science pay a mere lip
service to this challenge given the disanalogies noted above.
As an aside it is worth noting that one of the most prominent scientific
realist argument is also equally targeted by the above criticism. The global
realist meta-abduction argument (‘no-miracles argument’), as developed by
Psillos (1999) and others, is a profoundly problematic exercise in philosoph-
ical explanationism. At stake is a ‘global’ reliability of the abductive method
of science, which is supported via an inference to the best explanation, a
philosophical inference that is continuous with explanationism in science.24
In my view the global no-miracles argument fails to bridge the gap between
scientific and philosophical explanationism. The fact that the explanandum
at stake is about science does nothing to diminish the above worries about
24Cf. Section 3 and note 11.
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the continuity gambit exhibited also by this realist argument.25
So far I have surveyed reasons for thinking that explanationism, even if
truth-conducive (in a qualified sense) in science, is not so in metaphysics.
Next I will turn a critical eye to the positive arguments for thinking that
the presumed truth-conduciveness of explanationism in science carries over
to metaphysics.
4.2 Issues with MC3
What works for the goose, works for the gander. Or so the advocates of
explanationism think: if explanationism is truth-conducive in science, it is
so also in metaphysics. Positive arguments to this effect typically point
to underlying similarities between scientific and metaphysical explanations
and the respective explanatory virtues. But what little has been said of the
pertinent similarities turns out to be problematic in the light of current ana-
lyses of scientific explanation (in as far as those analyses are not applicable
to explanations in metaphysics, in particular).
Swoyer (2008) typifies the slender attempts to support MC3. After not-
ing an obvious disanalogy between scientific and philosophical explanations—
only the former typically involve causal mechanisms—Swoyer points to the
relevant analogies:
There are a number of [common] explanatory virtues addition to
pinpointing causal mechanisms, however, including unification,
integration, and redescribing phenomena in a theoretically en-
lightening way. Seeing a common pattern at work behind seem-
ingly disparate phenomena certainly yields one sort of under-
standing. By describing the moon, the earth, and projectiles on
the surface of the earth as bodies with inertial and gravitational
mass, Newton was able to provide a unified account of their mo-
tions. Something similar can occur in philosophy. (p. 27)
Swoyer is not alone in pointing to unification and explanations’ power to
give understanding as relevant features of good explanations, shared by
metaphysical and scientific explanations alike. Typically these explanat-
ory virtues are characterised in extremely general and abstract terms. But
25Since I’m not concerned with defending scientific realism here, I refrain from exploring
better vindications of scientific explanationism. See Saatsi (2009) for further discussion
and a recommendation that a realist justification of scientific explanationism should pro-
ceed ‘piecemeal’ (as opposed to ‘wholesale’, as in the case of no-miracles argument), relying
more heavily on the role of experimental feedback that shapes our explanatory judgements.
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on closer inspection we will see that broad references to these features pay
a mere lip service to the literature on scientific explanation, which provides
plenty of reason to think that no substantive overarching account of such
measures of explanatory goodness can be given to unify metaphysical and
scientific theorising as desired.
Understanding. Let’s focus on explanations’ ‘power to give understand-
ing’ to begin with. (I will discuss unification separately below.) Is it safe
to assume that theories’ power to give understanding is a truth-conducive
epistemic virtue that can guide theory choice, relating epistemic agents to
the unobservable reality regardless of our domain of enquiry, so as to sup-
port MC3?26 Such an assumption is often tacitly made, without evidence,
by the explanationists.
We should worry about the validity of this tacit assumption. Without
clear understanding of ‘understanding’ (especially in philosophy), one may
be inclined to regard ‘power to yield understanding’ as too subjective and
psychological a notion to support a wholesale justification of explanationism
(unspecific to a domain of enquiry). This initial worry is much strengthened
by the fact that science itself turns out to exhibit a huge variation in its
theories’ claimed ‘intelligibility’ across different historical and social contexts
and across different domains of theorising (e.g. Kuhn 1977, de Regt & Dieks
2005). Our knowledge of the scientific endeavour indicates that scientists’
evaluation of explanations in terms of their provision of understanding can
be heavily influenced by various kinds of social and cultural factors; it is not
simply a matter of determining some objective feature of explanations.
For example, some excellent scientific theories in the history of science
have lacked the power to provide understanding to leading contemporary
scientists. For a well-known example, Huygens, Leibniz and much of the
scientific community regarded Newton’s universal gravitation as involving
an unintelligible action at a distance—a sentiment echoed by Newton him-
self (at times). By comparison, an average physics student today regards
Newtonian gravity as a perfectly cogent explanatory posit. Sometimes the
intelligibility of a new theory eludes everyone apart from its architects,
as when the physicists in the Copenhagen-Gottingen circle around 1926
claimed to understand quantum phenomena with matrix mechanics, while
most other physicists outside the circle regarded it unintelligible (de Regt,
26By ‘domain of enquiry’ I denote not only the subject matter of theoretical enquiry, but
it in combination with the myriad psychological and social factors that shape the study
of that subject matter. Thus, ancient Chinese astronomy constitutes a different domain
of enquiry from 20th c. western astronomy, for example.
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2001). There are also clear disagreements across different scientific fields
regarding the level of understanding provided by different theories and dif-
ferent theoretical approaches. For instance, it’s not uncommon for a group
of mathematical biologists to claim that an abstract mathematical theory
(e.g. of biological scaling laws) gives them deep understanding of biological
phenomena, only to be faced by severe dissent from other camps of biology
(see e.g. Keller 2002).
This kind of demonstrable variability in scientific explanations’ intelli-
gibility and power to give understanding speaks against the tacit assumption
made in support of MC3. In science it can be impossible to objectively rank
theories with respect to the level of understanding they provide, given the
way in which ‘understanding’ is interwoven with theorists’ social, cultural,
and philosophical background.27 Why would ‘understanding’ be any more
objective affair in metaphysics?
To be clear, those who defend explanationism in science must of course
also accommodate these data. But the realist arguments to this end can at
least appeal to specific features of science, such as experimental feedback
and an objective sense of scientific progress. Such arguments, being specific
to science, are of no help to an advocate of MC3 however.
The historical and social studies of science cannot be ignored by a natur-
alistic philosopher who (in the Quinean spirit) views philosophy as continu-
ous and in harmony with our overarching vision of science and scientists.
Psychology and cognitive science form an ineliminable part of that vision
as well. Some philosophers of science have recently turned to these discip-
lines to explore the relevance of scientific studies of explanation and under-
standing, resulting in increasingly naturalistic perspectives on these topics,
yielding hitherto unexplored challenges to explanationism in metaphysics.
Studies of the psychological state of understandings have revealed serious
issues with invoking the sense of understanding offered by an explanation as
27Such objective ranking eludes us, at least in so far as ‘the level of understanding’
provided is meant to be meta-cognitively accessible to theorists in question. In the context
of specific accounts of scientific explanation we can try to put ‘understanding’ on a more
objective footing by construing ‘genuine understanding’ (as opposed to mere ‘sense of
understanding’) as grasping of a genuine explanation. Such ‘genuine understanding’ may
bear no relation to agents’ own assessment of their understanding, however. If an account
of explanation offers a way to measure ‘explanatory depth’ it can be furthermore associated
with the level of genuine understanding. For example, in relation to Woodward’s account
of scientific explanation, understanding has been construed by some as the ability to draw
correct counterfactual inferences, rendering ‘the level of understanding’ proportional the
measure of inferences one can make. (Ylikoski and Kuorikoski, 2010) It is difficult to apply
this to philosophical explanations, however.
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a reason for accepting it. In his review of these issues, Trout (2007) argues
that “the research findings on judgment and decision-making [indicate that]
the sense of understanding is a common, but routinely unreliable, index
of intellectual achievement.” (p. 566) According to Trout this is not just
a matter of reduced reliability; rather, “there is little practical wisdom in
relying on the sense of understanding as a cue of a good explanation, or
even a potential one.” (p. 574) Trout argues for this by pointing to two well-
documented psychological biases (hindsight and overconfidence), as well as
other robust psychological phenomena.28
Trout primarily aims his challenge at scientists and scientific realists,
but it is obvious that the challenge applies to explanationism at large.29
If the sense of understanding evoked by an explanation is influenced by
psychological biases, and we are operating in a domain which does not return
any systematic feedback on our explanatory judgments, we ought to worry
about the grounds of basing an inference on understanding. Furthermore,
as Trout goes on to discuss in a more positive note, there are some responses
available to a scientific realist (qua explanationist), hinging on the role of
explanatory considerations in the empirical progress of science.30 But these
responses are difficult to extend to explanationism in metaphysics, where the
critical notion of empirical progress—involving predictive and instrumental
successes—is simply inapplicable.
In a spirit similar to that of Trout, Lombrozo (2011) reviews the grow-
ing literature within psychology and cognitive science that attests to the
instrumental value of explanations for everyday cognition, with lessons that
arguably generalise to science. According to the research reviewed by Lom-
brozo, explanation can have instrumental value in everyday cognitive tasks of
generating predictively useful theories and promoting the discovery of causal
structures, for example, by virtue of its intimate cognitive relationship to
28See also Grimm (2009) for a more optimistic vision on the reliability of understanding.
29In some domains scientists have grown acutely aware of these issues (e.g. the problem
of just-so-stories in evolutionary biology), in other domains less so (e.g. the problem with
the so-called ‘rational addiction theories’ in economics, cf. Rogeberg 2004).
30See Trout (2007, p. 586)
Scientific realists can assign a robust role to objective factors in
explanation—such as statistical and causal relevance—and value the con-
tribution of explanation to scientific progress. If your focus is not balanced
by a positive account of the sense of understanding in a scientific theory
of explanation, then it is easy to portray any criticism of the sense of un-
derstanding as the first step toward explanatory nihilism. But explanatory
nihilism is surely premature.
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learning and causal inferences. According to the picture painted by this re-
search, the cognitive mechanisms shaped for our everyday ‘theorising’ and
learning naturally carry over to our practice of science (where these mechan-
isms get refined by empirical feedback—e.g. confirmed predictions—that can
contextually shape our grasp of explanatory virtues, for example). These
cognitive mechanisms also naturally get applied to metaphysics, no doubt.
But while this line of thought can to some extent rationalise the explanatory
endeavours of science, the talk of the ‘instrumental value of explanation’ in
metaphysics is tenuous at best, and in the absence of empirical feedback
to guide our explanatory practices it is much more difficult to justify the
truth-conduciveness of those practices, especially when they are far-removed
from their cognitive origins. (This issue connects to the challenge discussed
towards the end of §4.1.)
Unification. Unification is one of the most often cited (alleged) good-
making features of both scientific and philosophical explanations.31 The
advocates of explanationism also often regard unification (ceteris paribus)
as a universally recognisable objective explanatory virtue of a theory, or
even as a constitutive feature of explanation as Friedman and Kitcher have
suggested.32 Thus, the thought goes, we can arguably assess philosophical
theories with some reliability by virtue of being able to gauge relative degrees
of unification.
However, in the light of contemporary philosophy of science the relation-
ship between unification and explanation is much more delicate in ways that
threaten to undermine broad appeal to unification in support of MC3. First
of all, the attempts (by Friedman, Kitcher) to view unification as a con-
stitutive feature of explanation have faced severe criticisms and are highly
contentious.33 And although there is an important seed of truth in the
weaker idea that unification is an explanatory virtue, the way this idea is
developed in different contemporary accounts of explanation offers no solace
for MC3.
For example, a well-received recent counterfactual theory of explanation
offers a promising way to construe unification as an explanatory virtue. In
this account unification comes out, first of all, as one of several competing
31See Swoyer (1999, 2008), Armstrong 1997, pp. 235–6), and Sider (2007), for example.
Some regard the argument for genuine modal realism in Lewis (1986) also critically hinging
on unification in a similar spirit. Ditto Sider (2011).
32Both Friedman and Kitcher also associate unification closely with understanding.
Cf. Friedman (1974, p. 15) and Kitcher (1989, p. 432).
33See e.g. Gijsbers 2007, Barnes 1992, Woodward 2003 (ch. 8).
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virtues, and secondly, as a good-making feature of individual explanations,
not of scientific theories per se. Let me elaborate. We can can begin, with
Hitchcock and Woodward (2003), by recognising that explanatory power is
naturally associated with the generality of an explanatory regularity em-
ployed. The basic intuition harks back to the covering-law model of ex-
planation according to which an explanandum is explained by subsuming
it under law-like explanatory regularities. The more these laws cover—the
more general they are—the deeper the explanation, according to the intu-
ition. Unificationist accounts of explanation took this idea as their starting
point, but arguably misidentified the sense of generality at stake. As Hitch-
cock and Woodward put it:
[T]raditional approaches to explanation have . . . focused on the
wrong sort of generality: generality with respect to objects or
systems other than the one that is the focus of explanation. The
right sort of generality is rather generality with respect to other
possible properties of the very object or system that is the focus
of explanation. (p. 182)
In their account explanation is a matter of exhibiting a pattern of coun-
terfactual dependence that describes how the explanandum would change
under various conditions. Explanations provide such modal information in
terms of generalisations that are invariant under appropriate changes in
some variable values (indexing determinate properties).34 It is a major at-
traction of the account that it provides the means to capture explanatory
depth in general terms, in terms of the range of invariance of a generalisa-
tion (cf. Hitchcock and Woodward 2003). Unification, furthermore, comes
out as an explanatory virtue to the extent it can be linked to generalisations’
degree of invariance. Far from being a distinctive explanatory virtue, how-
ever, unification comes out as one of at least seven different ‘dimensions’
of explanatory depth, viz. different ways in which generalisations’ degree
of invariance can vary (ibid.). It can be furthermore argued that some of
these different dimensions are systematically in conflict, and that scientists’
weighing of different dimensions—their assessment of explanatory goodness,
in other words—is typically contextual and pragmatic in nature (Ylikoski
and Kuorikoski, 2010).
Arguably we can account in these terms for the prevailing general intu-
ition (supporting MC3) that unification is an explanatory virtue (Ylikoski
34For example, Newton’s gravitational law is invariant under changes in the specific
masses and their relative distance.
21
and Kuorikoski, 2010). We can also specify more precisely the conditions
under which the intuition holds.35 The upshot is that unification is con-
nected to explanatory goodness in a rather specific and less objective way
than assumed by the advocates of MC3. Furthermore, the notion that we
can compare different theories in relation to this explanatory virtue sits
somewhat uncomfortably in the Woodwardian framework, which is primar-
ily concerned with analysing the depth of individual explanations. Thus, we
can make good sense of the notion that an explanation of Uranus’s orbit
in terms of general relativity is better than in terms of Newtonian mech-
anics. Or that the latter explanation does not improve if it cites the ideal
gas law in conjunction with Newton’s law, even though it (artificially) ‘uni-
fies’ two types of phenomena in the covering-law sense. But for this we do
not need the notion that Einstein’s theory is more explanatory than New-
ton’s by virtue of being more unifying. The notion that general relativity
as a theory has more ‘explanatory power’ than Newtonian mechanics may
or may not make derivative sense on the basis general relativity in general
furnishing explanations that are individually better in the relevant sense.36
But such derivative (and seemingly unneeded) notion of explanatory power
is intelligible (at best) when the individual explanations can in the first
place be compared in the Woodwardian sense. This particular analysis of
explanatory unification thus bestows no general notion of unification-qua-
explanatory-virtue applicable outside the province of Woodward’s account.
Thus, in as far as Woodward’s account captures the unificatory virtue of
scientific explanations, and in as far this account fails to capture the sense
in which metaphysical theories explain, one does not finds in science support
for the dictum that in general the most unified theories—whether scientific
or metaphysical—are the likeliest to be true since they (ceteris paribus)
35The explanatory power of an explanation is increased by integrating it into a unify-
ing theory only if it increases the amount of explanatory modal information provided.
According to Ylikoski and Kuorikoski (2010, p. 214):
[Such] integration [should] be more than formal compatibility or conceptual
coherence. The bodies of knowledge should come together in a manner that
allows new relevant inferences to be made about the phenomenon. The
requirement of relevance makes the idea of integration a local notion: it de-
pends on one’s epistemic aims. This contextual notion is quite different from
the global notion of unification advocated by the supporters of unification
accounts of explanation.
Furthermore, arguably such integration can often be achieved only by compromising other
dimensions of explanatory depth, for example by idealising away fine-grained detail and
accuracy.
36Cf. Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010.
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explain the best.
I have flagged Woodward’s account as an important example of con-
temporary philosophy of science that sheds light on scientific explanation
in a way that considerably complicates the simple picture underlying MC3,
according to which scientists appeal to unification as a theoretical virtue
much like metaphysicians do, via inference to the best explanation. Wood-
ward’s account is not the only game in town, of course, but other notable
contemporary accounts of explanation are equally hostile to the idea that
unification is an explanatory virtue of a theory. The ‘kairetic account’ of
Strevens (2008), for example, values generality in some very specific ways in
locating its explanatory difference-makers, but it does not associate any kind
of explanatory virtue with unification. So also in light of this recent account
of scientific explanation there is reason to worry about the commonplace
idea that metaphysical theories can be appraised in terms of their unifying
explanatory power simply ‘because scientific explanations are so appraised.’
Of course, none of the above discussion goes to show that unification
is not a theoretical virtue in science. But even if it is—even if more uni-
fied theories are generally better theories, ceteris paribus, by the lights of
science—the question is whether unification should be thought of as an epi-
stemic or merely pragmatic virtue. Here again it is natural to turn to the
history of science, which indicates that unification is often best thought of as
a pragmatic virtue, not as an epistemic guide to what the world is like. For
example, in her book-length study of unification, explanation, and realism
in science, Morrison (2000) points to various theoretical unifications in phys-
ics and biology that are not explanatory (as she argues), or at least were
achieved by means of mathematical structures and theoretical constructs
that do not reflect reality.37 The truth is that the historical record attested
by Morrison is a mixed-bag: sometimes theoretically virtuous unification is
a guide to ontology (e.g. Maxwell on electricity and magnetism), but often
it is not (e.g. the electroweak theory, or Kaluza-Klein theory).38 Given
37Morrison (2000, p. 232) sums up her take-home message thus:
[N]o single account of theory unification can be given. A philosophical con-
sequence of that claim is that unity should not be linked to truth or increased
likelihood of truth; unification cannot function as an inference ticket.
There can be no doubt that unity exists in science, that unified theories
have been enormously successful and that unity is a goal pursued by many
practicing scientists in a variety of fields. But nothing about a corresponding
unity in nature follows from those facts...
38See also Karaca 2012, Maudlin 1996.
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this lesson from the history, it is only right that in connection with some
exemplar cases scientists themselves have not been epistemically swayed by
mere unification, but have demanded independent evidence, as in the case of
Maxwell’s theory the vindication of which had more to do with the independ-
ent evidence for electromagnetic waves from Hertz’s experiments conducted
some years after Maxwell’s unification.
* * *
Contemporary philosophy of scientific explanation paints a fascinating
naturalistic picture the details of which challenge in various ways the strategy
of methodological similarity. This strategy, recall, aims to justify explana-
tionism in metaphysics on the basis of its role and (assumed) epistemic
status in science. For the sake of the argument I have granted that explan-
ationism in science is rational and reliable, although obviously the sense of
reliability has to be qualified in quite specific ways to fit the picture painted
above. Can scientific realists actually defend a sufficiently robust, yet suit-
ably qualified reliability of explanationism in science? Whatever the answer,
we have reviewed a number of relevant aspects of explanation and explana-
tionism in science that collectively throw considerable doubt on the abstract
vindications of metaphysical explanationism.
The explanationist can retreat: instead of trying to justify metaphys-
ical instances of inference to the best explanation, she can argue that some
metaphysical views get support directly through scientific instances of in-
ference to the best explanation. This is the gambit of confirmational holism
to which I now turn.
5 On the strategy of confirmational holism
Naturalistic metaphysics sometimes engages in exploring the ontological
commitments of science, as in the case of the so-called indispensability ar-
guments. I will now examine the connection between these arguments and
scientific explanationism.
The best known indispensability argument views mathematical realism
as a corollary of scientific realism (Colyvan 2006). Briefly and roughly put,
in the Quinean holistic picture of science the empirical justification for theor-
etical assumptions ‘bleeds over’ to (applied) mathematics. As Psillos (2012,
p. 53) puts it:
[I]ndispensability arguments capitalise on the strengths of sci-
entific realism, and in particular of the no-miracles argument
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(NMA), in order to suggest that a) the reality of mathemat-
ical entities (in their full abstractness) follows from the truth of
(literally understood) scientific theories; and b) there are good
reasons to take certain theories to be true.
An explanationist can also add that empirical justification is ‘mediated’ via
inference to the best explanation, as this is how we can arguably construe the
relation between our best theories and their empirical support. Furthermore,
the argument for scientific realism can itself be an instance of inference to
the best explanation, as in the case of the no-miracles (NMA) argument:
The epistemic optimism characteristic of scientific realism is based
on NMA. The argument, roughly put, is that empirical success
(suitably regimented so as to include novel predictions and the
like) offers good reasons to believe in the truth of theories, since
it is best explained by the claim that theories are true. Thus
conceived, NMA is blind to a distinction between abstract en-
tities and concrete ones insofar as commitment to both types is
implied by the truth of (literally understood) scientific theories.
(Ibid.)
The original (Quine-Putnam) indispensability argument, recited by Psil-
los, concerns ontological commitment of literally true theories. What should
we make of the fact that in light of the above discussion we are not justi-
fied in taking explanatory inferences in science as delivering literal truths?
If mathematical realism is but a corollary of scientific realism, presumably
it matters what kind of scientific realism it is rational for us to maintain?
Taking on board our complete understanding of science and its explanatory
endeavours, we must admit that the extent of our ability to answer ontolo-
gical questions with science, naturalistically, depends on whether or not, and
in what sense, scientific explanationism is reliable. The history of science
indicates that the reliability of explanationism is curtailed: explanationism
allows us to track the unobservable reality only in limited respects (cf. §4.1).
Such curtailed reliability can still generate considerable empirical successes
(including novel predictions and the like), if the outputs of explanatory in-
ferences selectively latch onto appropriate features of the world—namely
those features that entail the right predictions etc.39 Hence, the sort of no-
miracles argument alluded to by Psillos above is over-optimistic, since the
39For example, although Fresnel’s ether theories of optics or Newtonian gravity are far
from being literally true and their explanatory posits do not exist, these theories arguably
selectively latch onto reality so as to generate hugely impressive empirical successes.
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best realist explanations of the empirical success of science need not be in
terms of the literal truth of theories. In the history of science the realist
must repeatedly explain the empirical success of theories that are only par-
tially veridical, in a way that is compatible with the curtailed reliability of
the scientific method.
We have reason to worry about indispensability arguments, since we
have reason to worry that realist explanations of empirical success fail to
support mathematical realism.40 It is a considerable, hitherto unsettled
question whether there is any support for mathematical realism (or other
paradigmatically metaphysical views, such as presentism) to be found in the
best scientific realist arguments. I am skeptical, but I won’t argue for this
here. My present point is that our overarching understanding of scientific
explanation and explanationism can challenge the strategy of confirmational
holism according to which the scientific realist should by her own lights be
committed to paradigmatically metaphysical views.
The recent literature on the indispensability argument displays a broad
consensus according to which scientific realist commitments cannot be read
off from our best theories construed as true simpliciter. Philosophers are
nowadays much less concerned with mathematics’ unqualified indispensab-
ility in science—the unvarnished Quinean notion that our best scientific
theories simply quantify over mathematics. The focus has rather shifted
to mathematics’ indispensability for scientific explanations.41 This shift
presents a further explanationist twist on the strategy of confirmational
holism.42 The champions of the new ‘explanatory indispensability argu-
ment’ envisage a more direct route from scientific realism to mathematical
40I think Hawley (2006) is methodologically on the right track in thinking that in natur-
alistic metaphysics “we have reason to believe metaphysical claims to the extent that they
are genuinely involved in generating empirical success” (p. 460, my emphasis). Hawley
argues that the indispensable role of metaphysical assumptions in science can be revealed
by their involvement in the best realist explanations of some empirical successes of sci-
ence. But while I broadly agree with Hawley’s methodological pronouncement, I see no
grounds for her optimistic belief that “there are actual cases in which the involvement of
a metaphysical claim in an empirically successful scientific theory provides some reason
to think that the claim is true.” (p. 456)
41See, for example, Colyvan (2012).
42Baker (2005) puts it thus:
A crucial plank of the scientific realist position involves inference to the best
explanation (IBE) to justify the postulation in particular cases of unobserv-
able theoretical entities. . . . [T]he indispensability debate only gets of the
ground if both sides take IBE seriously, which suggests that explanation is
of key importance in this debate. (225)
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realism, based on the notion that (for a scientific realist) ontological commit-
ment and scientific explanation are directly connected. Realist commitment
to mathematics allegedly follows from the admission that mathematics plays
a genuine ‘explanatory role’ in science.
Although the focus on explanation admittedly enhances the indispens-
ability argument, our best understanding of scientific explanation yet again
considerably complicates the key issue at stake. The (burgeoning) literat-
ure on the explanatory indispensability argument has by and large taken for
granted the connection between explanatory indispensability and ontological
commitment, without any reference to a particular conception of explana-
tion to underwrite this connection. Prima facie innocent assumptions con-
cerning explanations’ ontological commitments turn out to harbour various
complications, however, when examined in relation to specific accounts of
explanation. In particular, the literature on the indispensability argument is
rife with references to ‘mathematics’ (indispensable) explanatory role,’ but
the key notion of ‘explanatory role’ has been mostly left unanalysed. This
is a major shortcoming: the notion of ‘mathematics’ explanatory role’ must
be examined in relation to different analyses and conceptions of explana-
tion to properly judge whether mathematics plays the kind of ontologically
committing explanatory role that matters for the indispensability argument.
This is critical because in the context of different accounts of explanation we
can delineate different kinds of explanatory roles. The admission that math-
ematics is in a sense ‘genuinely explanatory’, or is ‘playing an explanatory
role’, does not by itself at all imply that it is playing the right kind of explan-
atory role. Saatsi (forthcoming a) draws some critical distinctions between
different types of explanatory roles—in connection with some leading ‘ontic’
accounts of explanation in particular—pointing to various hitherto unappre-
ciated challenges faced by the strategy of confirmational holism. A properly
informed analysis of scientific explanation is again required in order to see
whether scientific practice can underwrite a naturalistic argument to a meta-
physical conclusion (viz. mathematical realism).
6 Coda
Swoyer, a keen advocate of explanationism in metaphysics, engages in a
contemporary debate on abstract objects with Dorr (Sider et al. 2007). The
two debaters largely agree on the methodology of their domain of enquiry:
metaphysical theories are to be evaluated on their explanatory merits, where
those merits are judged like the explanatory merits of scientific theories. In
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general, Dorr grants that:
There is something very attractive about the idea that we should
try to make progress in philosophy by learning from the discip-
lines in which progress is most manifest, namely the sciences.
More specifically, the proposal is that we should take as our start-
ing point the large and impressive body of case-by-case epistem-
ological judgments shared by all scientific realists. We then de-
cide what we ought to believe about controversial philosophical
questions in accordance with whichever epistemological theory
does the best job of accounting for and systematizing these data.
(2007, p. 43, my emphasis)43
I agree. But as far as there are any judgments shared by all scientific realists,
these judgments raise considerable challenges to explanationism in meta-
physics. Inference to the best explanation in metaphysics is badly in need
of justification that is properly grounded in our best understanding of the
nature of scientific theorising and explanation, and the role and limits of
inference to the best explanation in science.
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